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Politics of folk psychology: Believing what others believe

Tooming, Uku (2021) Politics of folk psychology: Believing what others believe. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 36 (3). pp. 361-374. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that by attributing beliefs the attributer is pushed toward taking a stand on the content of those beliefs and that what stand they take partially depends on the relationship between the attributer and the attributee. In particular, if the attributee enjoys a higher social standing than the attributer, the latter is disposed to adopt the attributed belief, as long as certain other conditions are met. I will call this view the Adoption-by-Attribution model. Because of the non-epistemic influence that derives from the relation of inequality, belief attribution can reinforce the existing unequal power relations and contribute to epistemic injustice.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Tooming, Ukuuku.tooming@gmail.com0000-0002-4632-7979
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: belief, belief attribution, folk psychology, epistemic injustice, testimony
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 09 Dec 2021 05:01
Last Modified: 09 Dec 2021 05:01
Item ID: 19998
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.21966
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Social Psychology
Date: September 2021
Page Range: pp. 361-374
Volume: 36
Number: 3
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19998

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