Pence, Charles H. (2022) Whatever Happened to Reversion? [Preprint]
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Text (Accepted at Studies in History and Philosophy of Science)
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Abstract
The idea of ‘reversion’ or ‘atavism’ has a peculiar history. For many authors in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries – including Darwin, Galton, Pearson, Weismann, and Spencer, among others – reversion was one of the central phenomena which a theory of heredity ought to explain. By only a few decades later, however, Fisher and others could look back upon reversion as a historical curiosity, a non-problem, or even an impediment to clear theorizing. I explore various reasons that reversion might have appeared to be a central problem for this first group of figures, focusing on their commitment to a variety of conceptual features of evolutionary theory; discuss why reversion might have then ceased to be an interesting phenomenon; and, finally, close with some more general thoughts about the death of scientific problems.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | reversion, atavism, Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, W. F. R. Weldon, R. A. Fisher | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > History of Science Case Studies |
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Depositing User: | Charles H. Pence | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 02 Feb 2022 02:23 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 02 Feb 2022 02:23 | ||||||
Item ID: | 20184 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > History of Science Case Studies |
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Date: | 31 January 2022 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20184 |
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