Pfeifer, Jessica
(2004)
Why Selection and Drift Might be Distinct.
In: UNSPECIFIED.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that selection and drift might be distinct. This contradicts recent arguments by Brandon (forthcoming) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that such a distinction “violates sound probabilistic thinking” (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 62). While their arguments might be valid under certain assumptions, they overlook a possible way to make sense of the distinction. Whether this distinction makes sense, I argue, depends on the source of probabilities in natural selection. In particular, if the probabilities used in defining fitness values are at least partly a result of abstracting from or ignoring certain features of the environment, then selection and drift might in fact be causally distinct.
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