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Brutalist Fundamentalism: Radical and Moderate

Giannotti, Joaquim (2022) Brutalist Fundamentalism: Radical and Moderate. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In contemporary metaphysics, the doctrine that the fundamental facts are those which are wholly ungrounded is the received view or something near enough. Against this radical brutalism, several metaphysicians argued in favour of the existence of fundamental facts that are moderately brute or merely partially grounded. However, the arguments for moderately brute facts rely on controversial metaphysical scenarios. This paper aims to counteract the tendency in favour of radical brutalism on scientific grounds. It does so by showing that naturalistic metaphysicians can appeal to plausible considerations from physical theory to establish the existence of moderately brute facts. But should the naturalistic metaphysician embrace moderate brutalism, namely the view that the fundamental facts are those which are merely partially ungrounded? Here I argue for a negative answer, recommending a more inclusive pluralism about the kinds of brute facts we can expect to find in nature.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Giannotti, Joaquim0000-0002-4058-4093
Keywords: fundamentality, fundamental facts, brute facts, quantum field theory
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
Depositing User: Dr Joaquim Giannotti
Date Deposited: 21 Apr 2022 04:07
Last Modified: 21 Apr 2022 04:07
Item ID: 20478
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
Date: April 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20478

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