Freeborn, David Peter Wallis
(2022)
The Invention of New Strategies in Bargaining Games.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Bargaining games have played a prominent role in modeling the evolution of social conventions. Previous models generally assumed that agents must choose from a predetermined, finite set of strategy options. Here, I present a new model of two agents learning in bargaining games in which new strategies must be invented and reinforced. I use simulations to study the dynamics of the model and to test the extent to which it leads to outcomes that are fair or efficient. Mean demands peak a little below the fair solution, with a moderate variation around this. Mean rewards are a little lower than mean demands. The outcomes are somewhat efficient, but a significant part of the resource is wasted nonetheless. I investigate several modifications of the model, by implementing two forms of forgetting, and restricting the set of strategies that can be invented. One form of forgetting increases the average fairness and decreases the variation and improves the efficiency, a second form widens the variation, with little change to the efficiency. I test one restriction of the possible strategies, which has little overall effect on the fairness and efficiency.
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