Kubiak, Adam P. and Kawalec, Paweł (2022) Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0925-4560

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Abstract

We analyse the issue of using prior information in frequentist statistical inference. For that purpose, we scrutinise different kinds of sampling designs in Jerzy Neyman’s theory to reveal a variety of ways to explicitly and objectively engage with prior information. Further, we turn to the debate on sampling paradigms (design-based vs. model-based approaches) to argue that Neyman’s theory supports an argument for the intermediate approach in the frequentism vs. Bayesianism debate. We also demonstrate that Neyman’s theory, by allowing non-epistemic values to influence evidence collection and formulation of statistical conclusions, does not compromise the epistemic reliability of the procedures and may improve it. This undermines the value-free ideal of scientific inference.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kubiak, Adam P. adampkubiak@gmail.com 0000-0001-7178-3784 Kawalec, Paweł pawel.kawalec@kul.pl 0000-0001-7618-8298
Keywords:	frequentism, design-based approach, model-based approach, non-epistemic factors, sampling, Neyman, prior information, value-free ideal of science
Subjects:	General Issues > Data General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Adam Kubiak
Date Deposited:	18 May 2022 13:28
Last Modified:	18 May 2022 13:28
Item ID:	20624
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Subjects:	General Issues > Data General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	17 May 2022
ISSN:	0925-4560
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20624

Available Versions of this Item

• Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs and Social (Non-epistemic) Influences: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory. (deposited 13 Mar 2021 00:03)
  • Prior Information in Frequentist Study Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory. (deposited 10 Jun 2021 03:40)
    • Prior Information in Frequentist Research Designs: The Case of Neyman’s Sampling Theory. (deposited 18 May 2022 13:28) [Currently Displayed]

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