Popa, Eugen (2022) On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘hinge commitments.’ I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal (‘shallow’) can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Deep disagreements; Argumentation; Rational resolution; Joint Experience of Facts; Fundamental Epistemic Principles | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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Depositing User: | dr. Eugen Popa | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 28 May 2022 14:56 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 28 May 2022 14:56 | ||||||
Item ID: | 20672 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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Date: | 2022 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20672 |
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