Ward, Zina B.
(2022)
Disagreement and Values in Science.
[Preprint]
Abstract
It's generally taken to be desirable for scientific hypotheses to possess what are often called "epistemic values": theoretical virtues like fruitfulness, explanatory power, simplicity, and scope (Kuhn 1977). Although most scientists endorse at least some of these values, they often interpret or weigh them differently. Does the presence of disagreement about epistemic values imply that science is laden with non-epistemic values? Here I'll try to answer this question after surveying epistemic values and the disagreements surrounding them.
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