Dressel, Markus (2022) Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 37 (2). pp. 181-207. ISSN 2171-679X
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Abstract
The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) | ||||||
| Keywords: | inductive risk; value-free ideal; scientist qua scientist; Bayesianism; wishful thinking; prescription | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 31 Jul 2022 03:43 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 31 Jul 2022 03:43 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 20990 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1387/theoria.22795 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Date: | May 2022 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 181-207 | ||||||
| Volume: | 37 | ||||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 2171-679X | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20990 |
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