Badino, Massimiliano (2004) The Epistemological Root of the Problem of Induction. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the epistemological significance of the problem of induction. In the first section, the foundation of this problem is identified in the thesis of gnoseological dualism: we only know our representations as separate from ‘the world itself’. This thesis will be countered by the thesis of gnoseological monism. In the second section, the implications of Hume’s skeptical thesis will be highlighted and it will be demonstrated how the point of view of gnoseological monism can offer a way out that I call the hermeneutic theory of induction. In the third section, a formal approach is proposed in agreement with this theory. Using tools of the theory of information, this defines the conditions of acceptance or refusal of a hypothesis starting with an experiment. In the fourth section, the epistemological consequences of this approach are analyzed.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Badino, Massimiliano
Additional Information:	Submitted for publication to Erkenntnis
Keywords:	Induction, epistemology, information
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User:	Dr. Massimiliano Badino
Date Deposited:	13 Dec 2004
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID:	2115
Public Domain:	No
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date:	2004
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2115

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