Haueis, Philipp (2022) Revising scientific concepts with multiple meanings: beyond pluralism and eliminativism. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

In the recent debate about scientific concepts, pluralists claim that scientists can legitimately use concepts with multiple meanings, while eliminativists argue that scientists should abandon such concepts in favor of more precisely defined subconcepts. While pluralists and eliminativists already share key assumptions about conceptual development, their normative positions still appear to suggest that the process of revising concepts is a dichotomous choice between keeping the concept and abandoning it altogether. To move beyond pluralism and eliminativism, I discuss three options of revising concepts in light of new findings, and when scientists should choose each of them.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Haueis, Philipp philipp.haueis@uni-bielefeld.de 0000-0002-0935-9015
Keywords:	Scientific concepts, Pluralism, Eliminativism, Conceptual Retirement, Conceptual Housekeeping
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Dr. Philipp Haueis
Date Deposited:	27 Sep 2022 12:24
Last Modified:	27 Sep 2022 12:24
Item ID:	21213
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21213

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