Schiller, Henry Ian (2022) Genericity and Inductive Inference. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We can be justified in acting on the basis of evidence confirming a generalization. I argue that such evidence supports belief in non-quantificational – or generic – generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of confirmation. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of a reasoning instinct that is typically (but not always) correct, and allows us to approximate the predictions that formal epistemology would make.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Schiller, Henry Ian h.i.schiller@sheffield.ac.uk
Keywords:	generics; inductive inference; Hume
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making General Issues > Natural Kinds
Depositing User:	Dr Henry Ian Schiller
Date Deposited:	07 Nov 2022 14:44
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2022 14:44
Item ID:	21366
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making General Issues > Natural Kinds
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21366

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