Reuter, Kevin (2022) Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Experimental philosophy of consciousness seeks to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that there is no folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think Microsoft feels regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not believe that duplicated hamsters have phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I review these and other fascinating claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. In doing so, I also show why experimental philosophy of consciousness is hard, although perhaps not quite as hard as studying phenomenal consciousness itself.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | experimental philosophy consciousness phenomenal states pains colors emotions folk concept | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Kevin Reuter | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 07 Nov 2022 15:35 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2022 15:35 | ||||||
Item ID: | 21370 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Date: | 7 November 2022 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21370 |
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