Brading, Katherine and Landry, Elaine (2005) A minimal construal of scientific structuralism. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is the recent revival of interest in structuralist approaches to science and, in particular, the structural realist position in philosophy of science . The challenge facing scientific structuralists is three-fold: i) to characterize scientific theories in ‘structural’ terms, and to use this characterization ii) to establish a theory-world connection (including an explanation of applicability) and iii) to address the relationship of ‘structural continuity’ between predecessor and successor theories. Our aim is to appeal to the notion of shared structure between models to reconsider all of these challenges, and, in so doing, to classify the varieties of scientific structuralism and to offer a ‘minimal’ construal that is best viewed from a methodological stance.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Brading, Katherine Landry, Elaine
Keywords:	structuralism structural realism semantic view of theories models
Subjects:	General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Katherine A. Brading
Date Deposited:	29 Jan 2005
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID:	2181
Public Domain:	No
Conference Date:	November 2004
Conference Location:	Austin, Texas
Subjects:	General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2005
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2181

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