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Does Bohmian mechanics solve the measurement problem? Maybe not yet

Gao, Shan (2023) Does Bohmian mechanics solve the measurement problem? Maybe not yet. [Preprint]

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Abstract

It is widely thought that Bohmian mechanics solves the measurement problem by assuming that an observer's conscious perception of a measurement result is determined by the evolution of the Bohmian particles of her brain. In this paper, I present an argument against this received view. It is argued that when assuming that (1) quantum entanglement plays no role in our brain in forming our conscious perceptions and (2) a system whose elements have no causal connections does not have conscious minds, Bohmian mechanics fails to provide an explanation of our determinate conscious perception of the measurement result since observers in the theory cannot form conscious perceptions. This means that before we find plausible reasons to reject one or both of these two common assumptions in neuroscience and philosophy of mind, Bohmian mechanics does not solve the measurement problem.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gao, Shansgao7319@uni.sydney.edu.au
Keywords: Bohmian mechanics; measurement problem; particle; entanglement; observer; conscious perception
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Prof. Shan Gao
Date Deposited: 09 May 2023 12:46
Last Modified: 09 May 2023 12:46
Item ID: 22085
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: 9 May 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22085

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