Pedroso, Makmiller (2023) The costs of too much cooperation. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Cooperative behaviors within a group face the risk of being exploited by `free-riders,' individuals that reap the benefits produced by cooperators without paying the costs of cooperating. Free-riders are often perceived as a burden to the group, since the group's survival depends on tasks performed by cooperators. However, this paper challenges this perspective, arguing that an excess of cooperators may actually lower the efficiency and persistence of groups. The perspective presented in this paper has ramifications to broader issues in philosophy, particularly the challenge of how to balance self-interest with the collective interests of the group. Ultimately, this paper seeks to highlight some of the subtle ways free-riders positively impact their groups, an aspect of free-riding that is often overlooked in discussions about cooperation.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | cooperation; free-riding; self-interest; redundancy; efficiency; persistence. | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory Specific Sciences > Complex Systems Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Game Theory |
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Depositing User: | Makmiller Pedroso | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 27 Jun 2023 13:09 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 27 Jun 2023 13:09 | ||||||
Item ID: | 22248 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory Specific Sciences > Complex Systems Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Game Theory |
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Date: | 13 July 2023 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22248 |
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