List, Christian (2023) The first-personal argument against physicalism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss a seemingly straightforward argument against physicalism which, despite being implicit in much of the philosophical debate about consciousness, has not received the attention it deserves (compared to other, better-known “epistemic”, “modal”, and “conceivability” arguments). This is the argument from the non-supervenience of the first-personal (and indexical) facts on the third-personal (and non-indexical) ones. This non-supervenience, together with the assumption that the physical facts (at least as conventionally understood) are third-personal, entails that some facts – namely, first-personal, phenomenal ones – do not supervene on the physical facts. Interestingly, unlike other arguments against physicalism, the first-personal argument, if successful, refutes not only physicalism but also other purely third-personal metaphysical pictures.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Physicalism, non-physicalism, consciousness, explanatory gap, supervenience, subjectivity, objectivity, first-person facts, third-person facts, indexicality, hard problem, knowledge argument, modal argument, conceivability argument | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Physics |
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Depositing User: | Christian List | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 10 Jul 2023 13:46 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 10 Jul 2023 13:46 | ||||||
Item ID: | 22275 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Physics |
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Date: | 9 July 2023 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22275 |
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