Takuto, ENOMOTO
(2023)
Reconsidering the Second Argument on the Veridicality Thesis, "Semantic Argument".
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Reconsidering the Second Argument on the Veridicality Thesis.pdf
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Abstract
Philosophy of Information is a discipline that has been systematized by Floridi and other theorists since the late 1990s, but even before that, qualitative and quantitative aspects of the concept of information have been considered in philosophy and related fields. Contemporary philosophers of information have presented several arguments on the “Veridicality Thesis” (VT), which is a qualitative issue, and which remains an influential topic in the philosophy of information and is important for considering both the quantitative and qualitative aspects. In this paper, I will focus on the "Semantic Argument” (SA) of the argument for VT proposed by Floridi. By pointing out that the nuclear and structural ideas of SA are "the distinction between domains of discussion" and "the interpretation of the informative content H", I will reformulate SA in a different way than in the previous studies and re-evaluate SA as suggesting quantitative issues. As a result, the idea of "negativity of information" (which is not commonly assumed) could be derived from SA.
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