Suárez, Mauricio (2005) Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound. [Preprint]
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Abstract
On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in L. Bovens and S. Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, Routledge. | ||||||
| Keywords: | Causal Inference, Experimental Realism, Scientific epistemology | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Prof Mauricio Suárez | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 07 Apr 2005 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 18 Aug 2016 22:52 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 2252 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | February 2005 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2252 |
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