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Thought Insertion without Thought

Patel, Shivam (2023) Thought Insertion without Thought. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There are a number of conflicting accounts of thought insertion, the delusion that the thoughts of another are inserted into one’s own mind. These accounts share the common assumption of realism: that the subject of thought insertion has a thought corresponding to the description of her thought insertion episode. I challenge the assumption by arguing for an anti-realist treatment of first-person reports of thought insertion. I then offer an alternative account, simulationism, according to which sufferers merely simulate having a thought inserted into their heads. By rejecting realism, the paper undermines a widespread explanatory framework that unites otherwise competing cognitive models of thought insertion.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Patel, Shivamsmpatel@fsu.edu
Keywords: thought insertion; schizophrenia; dreams; simulation; cognitive explanation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Shivam Patel
Date Deposited: 12 Sep 2023 20:07
Last Modified: 12 Sep 2023 20:07
Item ID: 22536
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 5 July 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22536

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