List, Christian (2023) A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this discussion paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims – namely, “first-person realism”, “non-solipsism”, “non-fragmentation”, and “one world” – but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a “quadrilemma”. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID List, Christian
Keywords:	Consciousness, Subjectivity, Objectivity, Quadrilemma, Facts, First-person realism, Non-solipsism, Non-fragmentation, One world versus many worlds, Meta-problem of consciousness
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Christian List
Date Deposited:	28 Sep 2023 14:37
Last Modified:	28 Sep 2023 14:37
Item ID:	22582
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	28 September 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22582

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• A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness. (deposited 28 Sep 2023 14:37) [Currently Displayed]
  • A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness. (deposited 03 Jun 2024 14:39)

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