neto, celso (2023) The Risks of Biological Races. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. Non-racist versions of BRR have emerged recently based on sophisticated work in science and philosophy (Hardimon 2003; 2017; Spencer 2012; 2014; 2019a). In this paper, I examine Quayshawn Spencer’s version of BRR and argue that it fails to fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. To do so, I rely on the “science and values” literature and the notions of inductive, epistemic, and ethical risk (Douglas 2000; Douglas 2009; Brown 2015; Biddle and Kukla 2017; Elliot and Richards 2017). Once one realizes the complex relationship between these types of risks and BRR, Spencer’s metaphysical arguments become less appealing than they might first seem. This analysis raises questions about what it means to do metaphysics of race in a socially responsible way. Hence, this paper aims at making these questions visible, inviting metaphysicians of race to directly engage with them.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID neto, celso C.Alves-Neto@exeter.ac.uk 0000-0003-4666-3857
Keywords:	race; biological race realism; epistemic risk; ethical risk; non-epistemic values;
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Feminist Approaches General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Celso Neto
Date Deposited:	18 Oct 2023 21:24
Last Modified:	18 Oct 2023 21:24
Item ID:	22676
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Feminist Approaches General Issues > Natural Kinds General Issues > Science and Society General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22676

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