McCormack, Kael (2023) Desire-as-belief and evidence sensitivity. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 38 (2). pp. 155-172. ISSN 2171-679X
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Abstract
Alex Gregory (2017a; 2017b; 2018; 2021) provides an ingenious, systematic defence of the view that desires are a species of belief about normative reasons. This view explains how desires make actions rationally intelligible. Its main rival, which is attractive for the same reason, says that desires involve a quasi-perceptual appearance of value. Gregory (2017a; 2018; 2021) has argued that his view provides the superior explanation of how desires are sensitive to evidence. Here, I show that the quasi-perceptual view fairs better in this regard. Negatively, I argue that Gregory’s view overestimates the evidence-sensitivity of desires and implies that we are systematically mistaken in having different attitudes about desires and beliefs. Positively, I argue that quasi-perceptual appearances of value are brought into the scope of rational control through their dependence on prior representational states. I also provide a novel explanation of why some kinds of desires are resistant to rational control. I propose that desires are produced through exercises of an affective capacity to discriminate value. Variations in the way this capacity is exercised, and its links to prior representational states, can produce systematic insensitivity to evidence in certain kinds of desires. This paper advances the debate around desire on two fronts: first, it performs the neglected task of showing how the quasi-perceptual view can simultaneously explain both the sensitivity and insensitivity to evidence exhibited by desires and, second, it shows how the explanation offered is superior to one of its closest rivals, the view that desires are a species of normative belief.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) | ||||||
| Keywords: | desire, desire-as-belief, the guise of the good, belief, practical reasoning | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception |
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| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 27 Oct 2023 19:57 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 27 Oct 2023 19:57 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 22707 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1387/theoria.24249 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Evidence Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception |
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| Date: | September 2023 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 155-172 | ||||||
| Volume: | 38 | ||||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 2171-679X | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22707 |
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