Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhuja (2023) Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Bas van Fraassen’s stance voluntarism has raised the question of how to justify one’s own stance choice if one is to follow the voluntarist dictum that all rational stances, i.e. all those that don’t lead to ‘self-sabotage by one’s own lights’, are equally rational. van Fraassen’s response is that one justifies their stance choice based on one’s own values, but the problem is that those values only appeal to holders of the said stance and not others. In this paper I propose a pragmatist approach to justifying stance choice. I argue that we can provide stance-transcendent justification for our choice of stance based on its stance-transcendent benefits. Consequently, multiple stances having stance-transcendent benefits should all be embraced as it is the epistemically virtuous thing to do. I advocate a move away from the standard voluntarist position of being a stance monist in practice – i.e. defending and holding only one stance – while acknowledging other rational stances only begrudgingly. I defend an active stance pluralism where we strive to actively hold different (apparently conflicting) stances depending on the context. Where that’s not possible, I propose that we should at least enthusiastically encourage multiple stances (taken by others). In Section 1 I introduce epistemic stances via a discussion of stance empiricism and stance scientific realism. In Section 2 I discuss the problem of stance justification and explore a few different existing teleological proposals for stance choice. Finally in Section 3 based on numerous examples from science and philosophy, I argue for a pragmatic, active, normative stance pluralism. I conclude with some clarifications on the rationale behind active stance pluralism.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhuja sbhakthav@csun.edu 0000-0002-1156-1669
Keywords:	Voluntarism, Epistemic Stances, Pragmatism, Pluralism, Empiricism, Metaphysics, Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam
Date Deposited:	30 Oct 2023 02:07
Last Modified:	30 Oct 2023 02:07
Item ID:	22719
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22719

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• Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism. (deposited 30 Oct 2023 02:07) [Currently Displayed]
  • Revisiting Stance Voluntarism: In Defense of an Active Stance Pluralism. (deposited 13 Nov 2023 03:35)

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