Moretti, Luca (2005) The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism versus Hypothetico-deductivism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | This paper has been published in Erkenntnis 64(1), pp. 115-138. (The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com) | ||||||
| Keywords: | Confirmation paradox, tacking by disjunction, Bayesianism, Hypothetico-deductivism, total evidence, Gemes, Kuipers, Grimes | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
| Depositing User: | Luca Moretti | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 13 May 2005 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:13 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 2289 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
| Date: | May 2005 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2289 |
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