Menon, Tushar
(2024)
The inferentialist guide to scientific realism.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Scientific realism is appealing in part because it captures the following naturalistic impulse: claims about what certain perceptually-inaccessible domains of the world are like should be determined our best physics. In this paper, I argue that this naturalistic impulse is in tension with the standard representationalist metasemantic foundations of scientific realism. To better capture the impulse, we should instead adopt an inferentialist metasemantics. Using this metasemantics, I develop a view that I call `inferential scientific vindicationism'. I argue that this view fares better than scientific realism, structural realism and constructive empiricism with respect to the naturalist impulse.
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