Lim, Nural
(2024)
A Historical Shift in Philosophy of Science.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Following a history of empiricism from the Vienna Circle to Quine, in this paper I will show that a remarkable turn, which led empiricism to pragmatism, is witnessed. The Vienna Circle was faced with the crisis of skepticism, and in order to find an intersubjective ground for empirical knowledge, some logical positivists appealed to protocol sentences. However, there was not a consensus among the Vienna Circle’s figures about the role and status of these sentences; protocol sentences were supposed, at least to some accounts, to fill the gap between empirical theories and the physical real world. It will show such attempts were not successful. Having argued against fundamental aspects of the Vienna Circle, Quine admitted that we cannot find epistemologically objective platform to build an empirical theory which represents the reality, rather we need to appeal to pragmatical criteria to circumvent skeptical concerns.
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