Csatári, Ferenc (2024) In Defense of a Constructive Truth Concept. [Preprint]
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Abstract
I address some major critical arguments against a constructive truth concept and intuitionist logic. I put the notions of in principle possibilities and valid constructions (mathematical proofs) under scrutiny. I argue that the objections against a constructive account of truth miss target, thus they are not decisive. Eventually, constructivism is at least as cogent and natural a stance as realism.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Ferenc Csatári | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 15 Feb 2024 21:26 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2024 21:26 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 23087 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | 13 February 2024 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23087 |
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