Vasileiadis, Ioannis
(2024)
Medicine, epistemology and constructional paradoxes.
[Preprint]
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Abstract
The present study examines medical knowledge and practice (educational goals in medicine) from a philosophical point of view, i.e. interprets it in the light of dialectical materialism, which describes precisely the way doctors and other health professionals worldwide, perceive their work and how they gain –even without realizing it– the necessary knowledge for it. Thus, it essentially constitutes a materialistic critique of other philosophical views, most particularly constructivism, whose supporters, already since the middle of the previous century to present day, contend these views to be the epistemological background of medical (and other disciplines) science, claiming the creation of educational-instructional programs based on them, overwhelming the current scientific medical literature. These philosophical views, in fact, question the existence of an objective reality and our ability to perceive and intervene in it, in order to serve people’s needs. In the text, the anti-scientific basis of these philosophical-epistemological viewpoints, as opposed to dialectical materialism, becomes apparent. Furthermore, a parallelism is made between various epistemologies with set-theoretic issues (especially with the bases of set-theory and the Russell's paradox), giving clear indications of an inherent structural instability of the non-materialistic philosophical systems, and, therefore, uncovering their inadequacy in forming a stable and consistent epistemological basis for medical science. To note, the parallelism of set-theoretic considerations with the corresponding philosophical views, regarding the construction of each epistemological universe, is not some kind of mathematical proof but rather a translation of these philosophical views into another language. Mathematics can be seen as the most basic/abstract way in which we can describe the structure and kinesis of phenomena in any –perhaps– cognitive field. Thus, mathematical approaches, with the resulting contradictions and/or verifications, may be used to present, by generalizing, the way various philosophical epistemologies aim to explain the acquisition process along with the content of our knowledge regarding the objective reality. The point is, of course, that even if, following certain contemporary philosophical views, one can accept that everything goes, the same does not apply in mathematics –at least not yet. In science, what is mathematically invalidated cannot be accepted, in other words, a theory that ends up in an absurd conclusion is not valid. Finally, new concepts are introduced, as the inflation of information (based on Marx's definition of inflation in the economy), which is related to the flow and reliability of information, including medicine, in our digital era; and its association with the constructs of the above mentioned philosophical views is presented.
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