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A Hyperintensional Two-Dimensionalist Solution to the Access Problem

Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim) (2022) A Hyperintensional Two-Dimensionalist Solution to the Access Problem. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I argue that the two-dimensional hyperintensions of epistemic topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics provide a compelling solution to the access problem. I countenance an abstraction principle for epistemic hyperintensions based on Voevodsky's Univalence Axiom and function type equivalence in Homotopy Type Theory. I apply, further, modal rationalism in modal epistemology to the solve the access problem. Epistemic possibility and hyperintensionality, i.e. conceivability, can be a guide to metaphysical possibility and hyperintensionality, when (i) epistemic worlds or epistemic hyperintensional states are interpreted as being centered metaphysical worlds or hyperintensional states, i.e. indexed to an agent, when (ii) the epistemic (hyper-)intensions and metaphysical (hyper-)intensions for a sentence coincide, i.e. the hyperintension has the same value irrespective of whether the worlds in the argument of the functions are considered as epistemic or metaphysical, and when (iii) sentences are said to consist in super-rigid expressions, i.e. rigid expressions in all epistemic worlds or states and in all metaphysical worlds or states. I argue that (i) and (ii) obtain in the case of the access problem.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Khudairi (Bowen), Hasen (Tim)hasen.khudairi@gmail.com0000-0003-1726-6123
Keywords: Epistemic Two-dimensional Semantics; the Access Problem
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Depositing User: David Elohim
Date Deposited: 05 Apr 2024 18:28
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2024 18:28
Item ID: 23262
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Date: 7 May 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23262

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