PhilSci Archive

Classical Concepts and the Bohrian Epistemological Thesis

Singh, Mihir (2023) Classical Concepts and the Bohrian Epistemological Thesis. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
Original Manuscript.pdf

Download (305kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this paper we establish an Epistemological Thesis based on Bohrian thought constituted of three different claims: the continuity claim, the classicality claim, and the limiting claim. The thesis is founded on a notion of physicality as spatio-temporality which is used to show the necessity of application of classical concepts in physical descriptions within physical theories. Further, various views on the metaphysics of the wavefunction are analysed in view of the notion of physicality as mentioned above, along with the implied necessity of the classical conceptual framework. These approaches to the metaphysics of the wavefunction necessitated by non-locality is seen as the basis of limit of classical physical description, therefore, of description of quantum phenomena. In view of the established thesis, two more complete alternatives to Bohrian thought, Bohmian Mechanics and GRW theory are analysed and the persistence of elements of Bohrian thought along with a vindication of the doctrine of classical concepts within both of these alternative theories is shown.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Singh, Mihirmihirsingh2000@gmail.com
Keywords: Bohr, Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Classical Concepts, Physicalism, Metaphysics of Wavefunction
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Mr. Mihir Singh
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2024 14:34
Last Modified: 21 Jun 2024 14:34
Item ID: 23291
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: March 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23291

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item