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Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem

Elohim, David (2016) Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese. pp. 1-8. ISSN 0039-7857

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This paper challenges the soundness of the two-dimensional conceivability argument against the derivation of phenomenal truths from physical truths (cf. Chalmers, 1996; 2010) in light of a hyperintensional regimentation of the ontology of consciousness. The regimentation demonstrates how ontological dependencies between truths about consciousness and about physics cannot be witnessed by epistemic constraints, when the latter are recorded by the conceivability -- i.e., the epistemic possibility -- thereof. Generalizations and other aspects of the philosophical significance of the hyperintensional regimentation are further examined.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Elohim, Davidhasen.khudairi@gmail.com0000-0003-1726-6123
Keywords: Consciousness; Grounding; Conceivability; Epistemic Two-dimensional Truthmaker Semantics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Depositing User: David Elohim
Date Deposited: 30 Apr 2024 08:47
Last Modified: 30 Apr 2024 08:47
Item ID: 23324
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s11229-016-1254-2
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Date: 2016
Page Range: pp. 1-8
ISSN: 0039-7857

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