Lehrer, Ehud and Samet, Dov
(2024)
Interpersonal independence of knowledge and belief.
[Preprint]
Abstract
We show that knowledge satisfies interpersonal independence, meaning
that a non-trivial sentence describing one agent’s knowledge cannot be equivalent to
a sentence describing another agent’s knowledge. The same property of interpersonal
independence holds, mutatis mutandis, for belief. In the case of knowledge, interpersonal independence is implied by the fact that there are no non-trivial sentences that
are common knowledge in every model of knowledge. In the case of belief, interpersonal independence follows from a strong interpersonal independence that knowledge
does not have. Specifically, there is no sentence describing the beliefs of one person
that implies a sentence describing the beliefs of another person.
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