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Collapsing Strong Emergence’s Collapse Problem

Fritzman, J. M. (2020) Collapsing Strong Emergence’s Collapse Problem. [Preprint]

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It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad’s nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous.

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Item Type: Preprint
Fritzman, J. M.0000-0002-5086-809X
Keywords: C. D. Broad. Collapse Problem. Strong Emergence. Elanor Taylor.
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Dr. J. M. Fritzman
Date Deposited: 16 May 2024 10:57
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 10:57
Item ID: 23423
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: 14 May 2020

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