Luo, Kaiwen (2023) Thought Experiment without Single Reconstruction. [Preprint]

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Abstract

While argumentative accounts of thought experiments with an empiricist epistemology contend that thought experiments are merely arguments, there is a surprising ambiguity as to whether a single thought experiment corresponds to only one argumentative form. This ambiguity plays a crucial role and generates significant tension in efforts to defend this argumentative account against challenges. I argue that rejecting the single reconstruction view is essential not only for establishing a coherent strategy against challenges but also for elucidating the epistemology of a broader range of thought experiments. Moreover, the multiple reconstruction account of thought experiment does not render it inferior.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Luo, Kaiwen kwluo@hotmail.com
Keywords:	Thought experiment, epistemology of thought experiment, argumentative account of thought experiment, Thomson’s Lamp, empiricism
Subjects:	General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User:	Kaiwen Luo
Date Deposited:	05 Jun 2024 15:05
Last Modified:	05 Jun 2024 15:05
Item ID:	23531
Subjects:	General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date:	2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23531

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