Glass, David and Schupbach, Jonah N. (2024) Conjunctive Explanations: When Are Two Explanations Better than One? [Preprint]

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Abstract

When is it explanatorily better to adopt a conjunction of explanatory hypotheses as opposed to committing to only some of them? Although conjunctive explanations are inevitably less probable than less committed alternatives, we argue that the answer is not ‘never’. This paper provides an account of the conditions under which explanatory considerations warrant a preference for less probable, conjunctive explanations. After setting out four formal conditions that must be met by such an account, we consider the shortcomings of several approaches. We develop an account that avoids these shortcomings and then defend it by applying it to a well-known example of explanatory reasoning in contemporary science.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Glass, David dh.glass@ulster.ac.uk Schupbach, Jonah N. jonah.n.schupbach@utah.edu 0000-0002-8998-7352
Keywords:	explanatory reasoning, conjunctive explanation, formal epistemology, Bayesianism
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Historical Sciences
Depositing User:	Jonah N. Schupbach
Date Deposited:	24 Jun 2024 15:16
Last Modified:	24 Jun 2024 15:16
Item ID:	23619
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Historical Sciences
Date:	18 June 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23619

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