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Kuhn-Loss, Persuasion, and Incommensurability Again - Can Paradigm-Change be Rationally Justified?

Patton, Lydia (2024) Kuhn-Loss, Persuasion, and Incommensurability Again - Can Paradigm-Change be Rationally Justified? In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Chapter 12 of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is called “The Resolution of Revolutions”. It deals with the post-revolutionary period in which a rival paradigm has been proposed and now the proponents of the new paradigm must persuade the holdouts supporting the dominant paradigm. Kuhn is frank that the skeptics may never be persuaded. What follows is an interpretation of his account of the resolution of revolutions in Chapter 12. Kuhn’s position begins from the claim that experimental falsification is not the motivation for the proposal of a new paradigm. Instead, novel paradigms are developed to solve new problems in cases where doing so requires a new way of looking at and understanding the phenomena: an interlocked set of non-empirical assumptions (SSR, 147) all change at once. As a result, persuading adherents to the former paradigm is not a matter of presenting evidence, but of changing how they see and understand science. It may even mean persuading them to adopt new ways of doing and understanding science itself.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Patton, Lydiacritique@vt.edu0000-0003-2751-1196
Keywords: Kuhn, paradigm shift, Structure, scientific revolutions, incommensurability, Kuhn-loss
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Dr Lydia Patton
Date Deposited: 02 Jul 2024 06:00
Last Modified: 02 Jul 2024 06:00
Item ID: 23656
Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23656

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