Schindler, Samuel (2024) Kuhn on Scientific Discovery. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

In this chapter I review Kuhn’s account of discovery. Kuhn held that a scientific discovery requires both a discovery that an object exists and a discovery what that object is. Accordingly, Kuhn held that there are two kinds of discovery, which may be referred to what-that discovery and that-what discovery. The latter are Kuhn’s focus in SSR but considering both kinds of discovery allow for a fuller understanding of Kuhn’s view. Interestingly, Kuhn implied that one needs a correct conception of what one discovers, even though he failed to say how correct that conception needs to be. I propose a solution to this problem.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Schindler, Samuel samuel.schindler@css.au.dk 0000-0002-5656-9840
Keywords:	Kuhn, scientific discovery
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Samuel Schindler
Date Deposited:	22 Jul 2024 11:50
Last Modified:	22 Jul 2024 11:50
Item ID:	23718
Subjects:	General Issues > Evidence General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23718

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