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On a Mental Viewpoint Concerning Aggregative Normativity

Spiegel, Irina (2022) On a Mental Viewpoint Concerning Aggregative Normativity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The paper programmatically outlines the idea that normativity is inherently aggregative, and that the aggregenda contains mental states, often called attitudes. It focuses on mental states and their rationality, i.e. on what the aggregenda consists of. In this context, the technical paper “A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning” by Dietrich et al. (2019) can be taken as a useful reference. It shows that rationality of multiple attitudes cannot be generated via reasoning,
which implies some limitations for the constitution of the aggregenda. The idea is then heuristically to employ single attitudes, so that the aggregenda can be made
rational and therefore taken to proceed to the aspired normative aggregation.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Spiegel, Irinairina.spiegel@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Keywords: Normativity, mental states, belief, desire, aggregenda, structural rationality.
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Dr. Irina Spiegel
Date Deposited: 24 Aug 2024 05:06
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2024 05:06
Item ID: 23806
Subjects: General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Science and Society
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: 2 September 2022
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23806

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