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The Role of Overdetermination and Alternative Implication in the Evaluation of Conditionals

Pfister, Rolf (2024) The Role of Overdetermination and Alternative Implication in the Evaluation of Conditionals. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this article, the suppositional account and different approaches of relevance conditionals are analysed on a specific type of conditional: Conditionals whose antecedent and consequent have a relevance connection, but where the acceptability of the antecedent has no influence on the acceptability of the consequent. Such conditionals occur in cases of multiple implication of a consequent, as in overdetermination. When evaluating such conditionals, the approaches examined lead to different and partly incoherent results. It is argued that approaches to conditionals should consider such conditionals acceptable, which is a challenge for e.g. approaches based on statistical measures. Furthermore, it is argued that the probability of a conditional should be evaluated only according to the strength of the relevance connection between the antecedent and the consequent, but not according to other relevance connections. It is shown that only two approaches correctly evaluate such conditionals, one of which, inferentialism, may provide a basis for a coherent theory of conditionals.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Pfister, Rolfrolf.pfister@posteo.de0000-0002-0573-8544
Keywords: conditional, relevance conditional, multiple implication, inferentialism, suppositional account
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Mr. Rolf Pfister
Date Deposited: 23 Oct 2024 17:46
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2024 17:46
Item ID: 24104
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 23 October 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24104

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