Lin, Hanti (2024) The Logic of Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Causal Inference. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The 2021 Nobel Prize in Economics recognized a theory of causal inference that warrants more attention from philosophers. To this end, I design a tutorial on that theory for philosophers and develop a dialectic that connects to a traditional debate in philosophy: the Lewis-Stalnaker debate on Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM). I first defend CEM, presenting a new Quine-Putnam indispensability argument based on the Nobel-winning application of the Rubin causal model (the potential outcome framework). Then, I switch sides to challenge this argument, introducing an updated version of the Rubin causal model that preserves the successful application while dispensing with CEM.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Lin, Hanti ika@ucdavis.edu
Keywords:	Causal Inference, Counterfactuals, Epistemology, Philosophy of Social and Health Sciences, Philosophy of Language
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Medicine > Epidemiology Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr. Hanti Lin
Date Deposited:	16 Nov 2024 13:40
Last Modified:	16 Nov 2024 13:40
Item ID:	24222
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Medicine > Epidemiology Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	15 November 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24222

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