Kubiak, Adam P. (2024) Perspectival Realism and Frequentist Statistics: The Case of Jerzy Neyman’s Methodology and Philosophy. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which perspectival realism (PR) agrees with frequentist statistical methodology and philosophy, with an emphasis on J. Neyman's frequentist statistical methods and philosophy. PR is clarified in the context of frequentist statistics. Using the example of the stopping rule problem, it is shown that PR can naturally be associated with frequentist statistics in general. This paper demonstrates that there are explicit and implicit aspects of Neyman's methods and philosophy that are both compatible and incompatible with PR. Some clarifications and interpretations are provided to make Neyman's methods and philosophy more coherent with the realist part of PR. Furthermore, an argument is made that, based on Neyman's methods and philosophy, one is dealing with genuine and non-trivial perspectives. This paper argues that despite Neyman being a normative anti-pluralist, there are elements of perspectival pluralism present in his methods and philosophy. In conclusion, it is argued, firstly, that due to their ambivalence, Neyman's conceptions harmonize better with PR than with alternative, less moderate stances. Secondly, from the perspective of the statistical approach analyzed, PR should be treated as a descriptive rather than a normative position, and as case (or aspect)-dependent rather than a universal, absolute, or binding stance.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kubiak, Adam P. adampkubiak@gmail.com 0000-0001-7178-3784
Keywords:	statistics frequentism scientific realism scientific perspective models philosophy of science
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Adam Kubiak
Date Deposited:	06 Dec 2024 13:13
Last Modified:	06 Dec 2024 13:13
Item ID:	24359
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	9 November 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24359

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