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The Paradox of Self-Consultation and A Theory of Epistemic Work

Baumgaertner, Bert and Molyneux, Bernard (2025) The Paradox of Self-Consultation and A Theory of Epistemic Work. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We introduce what we call the paradox of self consultation: This is the question of how apriori inquirers, like philosophers, mathematicians, and linguists, are able to (successfully) investigate matters of which they are initially ignorant by systematically questioning themselves. A related phenomenon is multiple grades of access: We find it extremely hard to think up analyses of our concepts that do not suffer from counterexamples; moderately hard to think up counterexamples to proposed analyses; and trivial to verify that a provided counterexample is genuine. We consider a range of potential explanations, including two-system approaches, and show why they are unsatisfactory, despite being on the right track. We then proceed to give a naturalistic solution to the paradox and multiple grades of access. In doing so, we present a novel theory of epistemic work, which we connect to formal learning theory.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Baumgaertner, Bertbbaum@uidaho.edu0000-0001-8803-4771
Molyneux, Bernard
Keywords: Intuition; Paradox of Self-Consultation; Paradox of Analysis; Philosophical Cognition; Complexity; Formal Learning Theory
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Theory/Observation
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Dr. Bert Baumgaertner
Date Deposited: 04 Feb 2025 15:49
Last Modified: 04 Feb 2025 15:49
Item ID: 24676
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Artificial Intelligence
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Theory/Observation
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 15 January 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24676

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