Alvarado, Ramon (2025) On Axiological Loneliness. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Recently, Alvarado (2024) provided a conceptual framework to individuate and identify a specific kind of loneliness, namely epistemic loneliness. According to him, epistemic loneliness arises in virtue of and responds primarily to an absence of epistemic partners— i.e., willing, able, and actually engaged epistemic peers — as well as the lack of opportunities to engage with such. In this paper I argue that Alvarado’s framework and conceptual analysis of epistemic loneliness allows us to identify yet another kind of loneliness, namely one that can only be addressed at an axiological level. As we will see, this loneliness arises in virtue of and is particularly responsive to value-affirming, value-creating, and value exchanging circumstances, peers and contexts. Given its source and the factors which have an effect on it (either increase it or decrease it), this kind of loneliness is significantly distinct from epistemic loneliness. As will be shown here, we can have axiologically antagonistic epistemic partners. If this is so, it is possible that one can have epistemic partners, in the sense defined by Alvarado, and still be axiologically lonely. Axiological loneliness may prove to be even more central than epistemic loneliness already is to a person’s social, psychological and personal sense of belonging and hence of well-being.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Alvarado, Ramon ralvarad@uoregon.edu
Keywords:	philosophy of psychology, loneliness, values
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Ramón Alvarado
Date Deposited:	08 Feb 2025 15:28
Last Modified:	08 Feb 2025 15:28
Item ID:	24699
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	February 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24699

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