Gyenis, Balazs (2025) Physical, Empirical, and Conditional Inductive Possibility. Philosophy of Physics, 3 (1). pp. 1-22. ISSN 2753-5908
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Abstract
I argue that John Norton’s notions of empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility can be successfully used to analyze counterintuitive examples of physical possibility and align better with modal intuitions of practicing physicists. First, I clarify the relationship between Norton’s possibility notions and the received view of logical and physical possibility. In particular, I argue that Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility cannot coincide with the received view of physical possibility; instead, the received view of physical possibility is a special case of Norton’s logical possibility. I illustrate my claims using examples from Classical Mechanics, General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. I then arrive at my conclusions by subsuming Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities under a single concept of conditional inductive possibility and by analyzing the types and degrees of strengths that can be associated with it.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | physical possibility, empirical possibility, inductive possibility, material theory of induction, initial value indeterminism, time travel, freedom to act otherwise | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Physics |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Balázs Gyenis | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 04 Mar 2025 13:11 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 04 Mar 2025 13:11 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 24863 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophy of Physics | ||||||
| Publisher: | LSE Press | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://philosophyofphysics.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.31389/pop.148 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Physics |
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| Date: | 3 March 2025 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 1-22 | ||||||
| Volume: | 3 | ||||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 2753-5908 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24863 |
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