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Interpreting continuism as a mechanistic thesis

Camillo, José Carlos (2025) Interpreting continuism as a mechanistic thesis. [Preprint]

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INTERPRETING CONTINUISM AS A MECHANISTIC THESIS - final.pdf - Accepted Version

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Abstract

The (dis)continuism debate in the philosophy of memory revolves around the question of whether memory and imagination belong to the same natural kind. Continuism, on the one hand, defends that they belong to the same natural kind. Discontinuism, on the other hand, defends that they do not belong to the same natural kind. By adopting a minimal notion of natural kind, one can recognize that there are different legitimate ways of sorting kinds, which lead to different positions in the debate. In this paper, I interpret continuism as a mechanistic thesis, according to which memory and imagination belong to the same natural kind because they are underpinned by the same constitutive mechanism. I clarify the implications of this thesis and show that most of the discontinuist attacks on continuism do not constitute a challenge to the mechanistic thesis. I also present a possible challenge to mechanistic continuism. This suggests that there may be multiple (dis)continuism debates.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Camillo, José Carlosjosecarloscamillo@gmail.com0000-0002-4110-3386
Keywords: Continuism. Discontinuism. Natural kinds. Mechanism. Episodic Memory. Episodic Imagination.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Depositing User: José Carlos Camillo
Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2025 16:47
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2025 16:47
Item ID: 24864
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-04989-6
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Date: 28 March 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24864

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