Takács, Izolda (2024) One Approach to the Necessary Conditions of Free Will Logical Paradox and the Essential Unpredictability of Physical Agents. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Even today, there is no precise definition of free will – only mere hypotheses and intuitions. This is why this paper will approach the question of free will from a negative perspective, depicting a scenario in which free will seemingly exists. Subsequently, it will attempt to refute this scenario (as a necessary condition for free will). The absence of free will might seem absolute if scientific determinism holds true. Therefore, the goal of the study is to present a logical argument (paradox) that demonstrates the impossibility of an omniscient (P) predictor (scientific determinism), highlighting its inherent self-contradiction. This paradox reveals that the prediction (P = C) by a (P) physical agent of itself is objectively impossible. In other words, even a fully deterministic agent in a deterministic universe cannot predict its own future state, not even in a Platonic sense.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Takács, Izolda izolda.t@hotmail.com 0000-0002-1877-2848
Keywords:	Keywords: free will, necessary condition, paradox of predictability, Turing, logical paradox
Subjects:	General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Izolda Takacs
Date Deposited:	27 Mar 2025 14:44
Last Modified:	27 Mar 2025 14:44
Item ID:	24950
Subjects:	General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date:	22 March 2024
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24950

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