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Explanation, Understanding, and the Methodological Problem in Consciousness Science

Mckilliam, Andy (2025) Explanation, Understanding, and the Methodological Problem in Consciousness Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Philosophers of mind and philosophers of science have markedly different views on the relationship between explanation and understanding. Reflecting on these differences highlights two ways in which explaining consciousness might be uniquely difficult. First, scientific theories may fail to provide a psychologically satisfying sense of understanding—consciousness might still seem mysterious even after we develop a scientific theory of it. Second, our limited epistemic access to consciousness may make it difficult to adjudicate between competing theories. Of course, both challenges may apply. While the first has received extensive philosophical attention, in this paper I aim to draw greater attention to the second. In consciousness science, the two standard methods for advancing understanding—theory testing and refining measurement procedures through epistemic iteration—face serious challenges.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mckilliam, Andyandymckilliam@gmail.com0000-0001-8223-3817
Keywords: Scientific understanding, explanatory gap, theory-testing, epistemic iteration, natural kind method
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Depositing User: Dr Andy Mckilliam
Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2025 13:21
Last Modified: 28 Mar 2025 13:21
Item ID: 24966
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness
Date: 9 March 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24966

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