van Fraassen, Bas C. (2004) Representation: the Problem for Structuralism. In: UNSPECIFIED. (In Press)

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Abstract

What does it mean, to embed the phenomena in an abstract structure? Or to represent them by doing so? The semantic view of theories runs into a severe problem if these notions are construed either naively, in a metaphysical way, or too closely on the pattern of the earlier syntactic view. Constructive empiricism and structural realism will then share those difficulties. The problem will be posed as in Reichenbach’s The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and realist reactions examined, but will be argued to dissolve upon scrutiny.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID van Fraassen, Bas C.
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Bas C. van Fraassen
Date Deposited:	25 Nov 2005
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID:	2498
Public Domain:	No
Conference Date:	Nov. 2004
Conference Location:	Austin TX
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2004
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2498

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