Maxwell, Nicholas (2000) SIMPLICITY. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There are two problems of simplicity. What does it mean to characterize a scientific theory as simple, unified or explanatory in view of the fact that a simple theory can always be made complex (and vice versa) by a change of terminology? How is preference in science for simple theories to be justified? In this paper I put forward a proposal as to how the first problem is to be solved. The more nearly the totality of fundamental physical theory exemplifies the metaphysical thesis that the universe has a unified dynamic structure, so the simpler that totality of theory is. What matters is content, not form. This proposed solution may appear to be circular, but I argue that it is not. Towards the end of the paper I make a few remarks about the second, justificational problem of simplicity.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Maxwell, Nicholas
Keywords:	simplicity unity beauty metaphysics symmetry explanation empiricism theory-of-everything gauge invariance induction physicalism
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Nicholas Maxwell
Date Deposited:	29 Apr 2001
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:10
Item ID:	252
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2000
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/252

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